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Draft Recommendation
on European cooperation on armoured vehicles
The Assembl1,,
(t) Consrdering the nelv rvorld geostrategrc situatron characterised by' the drsappearance of the nsk
of brpolar confrontation and by the emergence of flashpornts for regional conflrct;
(tr) Bearing in mrnd the extstence of thc 1992Treaty on Conventronal Armed Forces in Europe and
the preliminan' ncgotiations begun early this )rear rn Vrenna to updatc the Treatf in the light both of the
end of the cold rvar and of NATO enlargement to include central Europe,
(tu) Takrng the vieu' that all of the above factors have a drrect bearing on the operatronal require-
ments of the armies of WEU member countries.
(w) Notrng that as far as armoured vehicles are concerned, those requrrements make it necessary to
mamtain heaw armoured units of vehrcles incorporatrng technologies that improve on exisilng perform-
ances in terms of fire-power, protectton and tactical and strategrc mobility,
(r) Noting furthermore the need to create more units comprrsing hght, multipurpose vehicles with
these same hrgh-performance features ;
(v) Takrng the view that European cooperation on armoured vehicles has been virtually non-existent
to date, with one exceptron,
(vr) Highlighting the fact that therc are ten European firms producrng thrs type of vehicle as com-
pared to only'tu'o in the Unrted States:
(wtt) Noting that for the trme being there rs no WEAG Panel I subgroup on armoured vehrcle coop-
eration and that an attempt to make progress in this drrectron farled to come to anlthrng for fear of
duplicating NATO efforts ;
(rx) Noting that efforts b1'NATO have also farled to produce anv tangrble results;
(x) Considering that the brref of WEAG Panel I covers standardrsatron of operatronal requrrcments
and cooperatlon on equlpment;
(xi) Stressing that the Panel's tasks include, tnter aha, promoting equrpment programmes that
represent good value for monev to meet the operational requirements of WEAG member countries and
improving capacity and competitiveness within the European defence rndustry;
(nr) Welcoming efforts made by France, Germany and the Unrted Kingdom in the Jornt Armaments
Cooperatton Structure (JACS) to get an infantry fighting vehrcle prograrnme off the ground;
(nrt) Notrng that this initrative is also running rnto major difficulties whrch may even lead to its being
cancelled;
(xiv) Takrng the view that restructuring the defence rndustry must be done not on a national but on a
Europe-wrde basts and cannot take place in the absence of cooperatlon programmes,
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COT]NCIL
I Task the Planning Cell to undertake a study to determine the operational requirements of WEU
members for armoured vehicles, covenng a range of equipment from combat tanks to light armoured
vehicles;
2. Consrder settmg up a WEAG Panel I subgroup on cooperation in Europe on arrnoured vehicles,
whose aims would be to.
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- 
promote the maximum possible standardisatron of operational requirements;
encourage defence industry, restructunng rn this area by adlusting capactttes to the reality of
the market place and making the industry more competitive;
assrst countnes interested in armoured vehicle cooperation programmes to rdentrfl, partners
wrth similar needs and schedules, having recourse to the Cooperatron Opportunrty Concert-
atron Office (COCO) for thrs purpose;
3 Ensure that such efforts are in line rvith those undertaken by the JACS with a vieu'to VCB I
productron.
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Expl an atory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr D{az de Mera, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
I The Treatl'on Conventronal Armed Forces
in Europe (CFE) u'hich s'as srgned m Pans in
1990 and entered into force n 1992 sought to
achteve parity betu'een East and West in terms of
levels of heav)' \\'eaponry srthin the area betrveen
the Atlantrc Ocean and the Urals This meant
destrolrng vcn' large numbers of heary' \\'capons
(tanks, armoured l'ehrcles rn general, combat air-
craft etc ) and placing limits on those that
remarned. The CFE Treatl'w'as srgned by the 16
NATO member states and by' the former mem-
bers of the Warsau'Pact 
- 
14 countnes rn all 
-
among them the successor states of the former
Sovict Unron.
2 At the start of ths vear ncgotratrons began
rn Vrenna to update the Treatv in the hght of the
neu' geostrateglc sltuatlon that has emerged since
the end of thc cold lvar and u'rth a vierv also to
the decrsrons thc Atlantic Alliance is shortlv to
take on enlargement tou'ards ccntral Europe.
3 Independentlv of the outcome of these
ncgotiatrons to bnng the CFE Treatl' up to date,
as of 1 Januan' 1996, the NATO member coun-
trrcs had destrol'ed 6 692 battle tanks, u,hose
numbers stood at 14 572 compared rvith a cerlmg
of 19 142 tanks.
4 Bv the same date, the former Warsau'Pact
countnes had destroy'ed 12 674 battle tanks and
still had l9 003 out of a total limited to 20 000
5. Turnrng to armoured vehicles. the NATO
countrlos had destroy'e d 6 448.leavrng them u'rth
22 464 compared s,rth an authorrsed ceiling of
29 822 The members of the nou' defunct
Warsau' Pact had alreadv dcstrol'ed 12774.
leaving them rvrth 27 974 out of a possrble
30 000
6 Thc Vienna negotratrons are not rntended
to halt rmplementation of the Treatl, and should.
moreover. accordrng to the French Mrnistry of
Forergn Affairst concentrate on trvo aspects.
movmg to national ceilings (the cerhngs fixed rn
1990 represented a straight 50% splrt between
the Warsau' Pact and NATO) and the possibility
of new states accedrng to NATO.
7 The Treatl"s exlstence must be borne in
mrnd as a background to any discussion of the
prospects and the defence role (present and
future) of armourcd vehicles. So too must the
new rnternational securitv situatron, charactensed
bv a profusron of regronal conflicts and the need
for cnsis-management operations to deal rvrth
them. A further consrderatron is the financial
restrictions placed on western countries' defence
budgcts
8 The above factors are influential rn settrng
operatronal requrrements reflectmg the need to
maintain smaller forces of heaw armoured
vehrcles and creatc larger units of hght,
multrpurpose vehrcles.
9 The tradrtronal specrficatrons for armoured
vehicles. fire power, protectron and tactical
mobilitr,. need to be supplemented by rvhat has
become a further requrremcnt. strategic mobrlitl'.
Nerv armour-protectron and electronrcs tcchno-
logics must also be rncorporated.
II. Armoured vehicle production
in WEU member countries
10 It rvould perhaps be appropriate to make
clear at thrs pornt that rt is not the Rapporteur's
intentron to comprle an exhaustrve hst of natronal
armoured vehicle productron capacities in WEU
member states. but simply,to grve an rllustration
of some of them. looking ln more detail at vehr-
cles that could be consrdered to be erther the most
tlpical or the most interesting from an opera-
tronal point of vieu-
I l. Nor does this chapter deal rvith vehicle
production under licence to third partl' states but
is confined to considerations concerning national
production from the concept dcfinition stage
through to vehrcle manufacture
12 Europe has ten companies manufactunng
armoured vchicles uhile the Unrted States has
onlv tu'o 
- 
leadrng to the obvrous conclusion that
Europe suffers from overcapacrty in this branch' L, Fryaro,23 Jantary 1997
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of ths defence industry and that fragmentatton
makes no economic sense Consequently,
rationalisation of the defence industry and the
armoured vehicles sector in particular is both
necessary and urgent
13. Such rationalisation should not stop at a
natron's own borders If Europe u'ants to com-
pete wrth the marketing networks of the major
US defence firms rt u,ill need to form trans-
natronal partnershrps. The domestic markets of
individual Europcan countries are obviously too
small to survive and it rs also clear that export
opportunities rn'ould lncrease rf streamlining
made European companies more competitive.
(i) Germany
14. The first Leopard 2A5 main battle tank
prototype was complcted b1' Krauss-Maffei in
1990 and, follorvrng regulation trtals, was
accepted for servtce the same year. Development
rvas funded by' Germany, the Netherlands and
Srvrtzerlandt and Krauss-Maffei rvas awarded
the contract in 1994. Deliverl'rvas taken in 1995
of the first of 255 Leopard 2 tanks being
upgraded to the Lcopard 2A5 configuration,
whrch Germany had ordered
15. As mentroned, the prime contractor for
both the Leopard 2 and the Lcopard 2A5 rs
Krauss-Maffei, while the turrcts are berng
upgraded by Wegmann. The last Leopard 2
tanks upgraded to the Leopard 2A5 versron *'rll
be delivered to Germany' in late 1998.
16 In 1994 the Netherlands also decrded to
upgrade 180 of their Leopard 2s to Leopard
2A5s, with an optlon on a further 150 vehrcles.
It rs anticipated that the programme rvrll be
completed in the course of the year 2000.
17. Srvitzerland for tts part took dehvery of
the last of rts Leopard 2 MBTs rn 1993 and wrll
not decide on upgradmg its vehicles until around
2000. Su'eden has ordered 120 Leopard 2A5s,
incorporatmg improvements in arrnour and com-
mand and control, rvith an option on a further 80
18 Sparn's procuremcnt of the Leopard 2A5
u'ill be considered later on in the sectton on that
countr\'.
19. The Leopard 2A5 has a crerv of four, a
combat rveight of 57.9 tonnes. a maximum for-
ward road specd of 72k{nlh (31 kmih m reverse)
and a road crursing range of 500 km It can
surmount 600/o gradtents. 30% side slopes and
vertical obstacles to a height of 1.1 m.
20. It comes equipped u'rth one cach of the
follou'ing guns. a main 120 mm, an MG3 coaxial
7.32 mm and an anti-aircraft MG3 7 62 mm gun.
It also carncs 8 smoke grcnade drschargers on
either side of the turret.
2l The decrsron to produce the Leopard 2
dates back to 1970 In 1974 the Unrted States
and Germanl, srgned a memorandum of under-
standing (MOU) under whtch both countrtcs
affirmed their rntention to make all reasonable
efforts to standardrse thetr tank progralnmes.
22 ln 1977 thc MOU rvas amended to rnclude
efforts to standardise some tank components
betu'een the two countrtes. These rncludcd
engine, transmissron. gunner's telescope, nrght
vision equrpment, fire-control s)'stem. tracks and
marn armament.
23. To meet US rcquirements, Germanl' built
another model. knoum as the Leopard 2 (AV)
(Austere Versron) but the US eventuallv chose
one of the tu'o competing American designs. the
Chrysler XMI It did ho$'cver adopt the Rhein-
metall 120 mm smoothbore gun.
24 Finalll', in 1977 thc German arml' selected
Krauss-Maffei as the prime contractor for series
production of the Leopard 2, plaung an order.
urth optrons. for I 800 vehicles, 990 of u'hich
were to be burlt b1' Krauss-Maffei and thc
remainder by' MaK. The first m the scnes rvas
dehvered in 1979
25 The cost of the Leopard 2 programmc for
the German alrn)' as announced in 1982 lvas
DM 5 100 mrllion u,rth the first production
batchcs berng for 380, 450 and 300 tanks
26. The specificatrons for the Leopard 2 arc as
follou's.
crcu of four.
combat werght. 55.150 tonnes.
maximum speed of 72 kf,n/h (31 km/h
in reverse),
range. 500 km.
gradients and equipment as for the
Leopard 2A5.
' Jon"'s Armour and Arttllery, 1996-9'7 .
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27 Earlv rn 1994. Krauss-Maffei, as a pnvate
venture, completed a technology demonstration
of the Puma MBT and, some months later rts
initral mobilitv trials. The Puma, in rts srx-wheel
road configuratron at 36 tonnes, lverghs less than
the Leopard senes and this makes rt suitable,
from an operatronal point of vrew, for potentral
Far East markets
28. It rs marmed by a 4 + 4 crew, has a
combat rverght of 36 tonnes and a speed of 70
km/tr and can surnount 60%o gradients and 30%o
srde-slopes. It has a 650 km range and is armed
wrth a main 105 mm L7A3 gun and a coaxial
7.62 mm MG3 machine gun and (2 x 4) smoke
grenade drschargers It rs also built by Krauss-
Maffei Wehrtechnik GmbH
29. Regarding reconnalssance vehicles, rvorthy
of note rs the Wiesel Armoured Weapon Carrier,
developed by Porsche and produced by MaK
S1'stem as prime contractor. Between 1989 and
1992, the German army' took delivery of 345
Wiesel vehrcles armed with Hughes TOW
ATGW launchers or Rhetnmetall 20 mm cannon.
The vehrcle ivas deploy'ed in Somalia rn 1993 in
both configurations The Wiesel is air-portable
and a vanet)' of different turrets and weapons
svstems can be fitted, enabling it to undertake a
u'rde vanetv of battlefield roles. The MK20
verslon carries a crew of 2 and the TOW ver-
sron 3. Both versions wergh 2.8 tonnes and have
a maximum road speed of 75 km/h and can deal
rvrth 60% gradients and 30% side-slopes. The
\\'eapons sl,stems are discussed above. It has a
250 km range
30 The MaK Wrcsel 2 Extended Base Vehrcle
rvas dcveloped as a pnvate venture and offers the
possrbrlitl' of carrvrng out tasks additional to
those of the version discussed above. It has a
combat rveight of 3.6 tonnes, can carry a crew of
6 and has a range of 550 km.
31. The Thyssen Henschel Transportpanzer,
an armoured personnel carrier, is the direct suc-
cessor of the Spahpanzer Luchs tvhrch started
being produced around 1975. The present
tmproved versrons (8 x 8, 6x6 and 4 x 4) are
produced by Th1,ssen.
32 It has a crew of 2 + l0 (passengers). a
combat rverght of l9 tonnes, a speed of 105 kmlh
on the road and a fordrng speed of 10.5 km/tr and
an 800 km range It rs armed with a 20 mm can-
non or a 7 .62 mm machme gun and also carries 6
smoke grenade drschargers.
33. Lastly, Krauss-Maffei completed its first
prototlpe all-purpose carrier vehicle in 1995
Krauss-Maffei claim that typical roles for lt are
as an arrnoured personnel carrier, a hght reconn-
aissance vehicle, a command and control vehicle,
a materials transport vehicle, a weapons carrier
for a turret-mounted gun, a mortar vehrcle, a
Iight arr defence system, a mrssile launchrng vehi-
cle and forward observer vehicle
34. This is a four-wheeled vehicle with a crew
of I + 3 and a combat weight of 6 tonnes. It has
a maxrmum road speed of 100 km/h. It is still at
the prototype stage and has not yet gone lnto
production.
(ii) Spain
35. SBB Blindados SA, a public hmited com-
pany, rs possibly the only European firm dealtng
solely with the production, rmprovement and
malntenance of armoured vehicles. Its order
books at present reflect the Spanish Defence
Mmrstrv's programme ln terms of armoured
vehrcle requirements for the Spanish army
36. Work on upgradrng and modermsrng 150
M60 A3 TTS battle tanks is expected to be
completed by the end of 1998. The 646 BMRs
(rvheeled armoured vehicle) by the same manu-
facturer is now being upgraded.
37. The BMR 6 x 6 310 HP is an amphibious,
aeroportable vehicle which can carr)' 13 men, rt
has a combat rveight of approximately 14 tonnes,
an engme power of 310 HP. a maximum road
speed of betrveen 96 and 103 km/h (depending on
u'heel type) and a range of I 000 km. It can
mount a 600/o gradient and 30%o side slope and
has a fording speed of betrveen 3 km/h (wheels)
and 9 km/h (hydrolets). The turret is equipped
wrth a 12.72 mm machine gun and a range of
optional equipment rs available.
38 The BLR 4 x 4 210 HP armoured person-
nel carrier carries a crew of 13 and has a combat
werght of 12 tonnes. It can achieve a maximum
road speed of 93 km4r and has a 570 km range.
It can mount the same gradrents as the BMR
6x6 and can be cqurpped u,rth a 5.56 mm
machine gun or a turret mounted rvith a 12.7 mm
machrne gun as well as other optrons
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39 Both vehicles were used to the Spanrsh
military authontres' complete satisfaction in the
conflict in former Yugoslavra and in other inter-
national missions undertaken by' the Spanish
army
40. Additionalll', the Spanish Defence Mrn-
istry is currently rnvolved m a cooperation pro-
grarnme with the Austrian Defence Ministry for
production of .an armoured infantry combat
vehrcle. The ASCOD (Austrran Spanish Co-
Operative Development) programme is better
known in Spaln under the name Pizarro.
41. Spain and Austria have cooperated over
thrs programme from the outset, in other words
from the definitron stage. Production rs berng
carried out jointly in both countries on vehtcles
for the arnles in therr oun and third countries.
42. The Pizarro weighs 25.2 tonnes (with
basic ballistrc protection) and carries I I people
(3 + 8) at a maximum road speed of 70 km/h (35
km/h in reverse) and has a range of 500 km.
43. Armament comprises a 30 mm x 173 duel-
feed Mauser MK 30 automatic cannon, a 7.62
mm x 5l coaxtal machine gun and a 4 x 3 76 mm
smoke grenade discharger system. It has a
digital FCC fire-control s1'stem and an electro-
mechanical gun and turret control equipment
with manual backup
44. SBB Blndados SA is the prime contractor
for the Pizarro progralnme whrch comprises three
phases: 1996-2001; 2002-2005 and 2006-2009
covering a total of 463 vehicles. The first phase
consists of 144 vehtcles at a total cost of 4l 583
mrllion pesetas
45. Lastly', it rs worth noting that in mid-1995
it rvas announced that Spain would produce 200
German Krauss-Maffei Leopard 2A5 tanks
under licencet for the Spanrsh Arm]', wrth deliv-
eries to run from 1998 at the rate of 40 vehicles a
year A Memorandum of Understandrng was
signed by both governments in Brussels, tn June
1995, covering this and other defence projects.
46. So far Spain has taken dehverl' of one
Leopard 2 from the German army for training
purposes and ts leasing a further 108 Leopard
2A4s for five years.
47. The prime contractor for the Leopard
2A5E wrll be SBB Bhndados SA and the
Spanish content of the Leopard 2A5E is expected
to be around 60-70% of the total Nevertheless
the change of government in Spain will probably
lead to changes to the agreements betrveen the
tlvo governments tn the regard
48. Indeed the Spanrsh Defence Miruster, Mr
Serra, stated on 7 November 19964 that he
wanted to examine again, on a realistic financial
and operational basis, what the opttons were for
Sparn's Defence Ministrl' and Spanish industrial
capabilitrcs with regard to the Leopard 2s.
49. Only recently. Defense News5 reported
that the Spanish Army rntended to increase tts
tank force wrth 320 Leopard 2A5 tanks and an
addrtronal 23 Buffel armoured recover)' vehicles
at a total cost of 500 billion pesetas. Negotia-
tions are proceeding slorvly because the Spanrsh
Government has not decided whrch Spanrsh firm
wrll bc involved in the project
50. The 108 Leopard 2A4s that the Spanrsh
arrny currently has on a rental basis form part of
its First Armoured Division and represent
Spain's contributron to the Eurocorps. They will
have to be returned to Germany if the additronal
320 Leopard 2A5s are not procured.
51. Finally it should be added that Sparn is
consrdenng increasing commonality in other
rvays, including possrbly buyng the German
armoured howitzer 2000 (Panzerhaubttze 2000).
Spain has a requirement for 132 of these.
(iii) France
52. GIAT Industnes is Europe's first-ranking
suppher of land defence equrpment and the indus-
try leader in France. A French pubhc compan\',
GIAT Industries was created on I July 1990 by'
setting up a consorttum of several French defence
firms. The GIAT Industries Group includes
other, marnly Belgian, internattonal defence
companies such as FN SA, Canons Delcour,
Browning SA, etc
53. In 1996, esttmated tumover was 8 300
millron French francs, 60o/o of which r,l'as earned
on the international market. The firm currentll'
a Drario de sestones del Congreso de los Diputados,
No 10-1. 1996.t Dnftrrt, -\rervs, 3-9 March, 1997' Jane's Armour and Arttllery, 1996-9'7
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emplo)'s 15 000 staff, 3 000 of whom work out-
srde France. It spends I 100 million francs on
research and development
54. GIAT Industries' marn fields of R&D are
global protection of weapons svstems (detection
and counterrneasures, composite and reactive
armour) future guns and ammunition (140 mm
guns and munitrons, electnc guns, rntelligent
ammurution, Murat insensrtrve ammurution, the
future soldier sy'stem and future armoured infan-
try combat vehicle) and battlefield robot systems.
55 One of GIAT industries' marn activrties is
thc production of armoured systems and turrets
and the logistical support that goes rvrth them
56 Its Armoured Systems Division, on four
industnal sites rn France, has a turnover of 3 900
milhon francs6 and has produced more than
18 000 armoured vehicles to date. The main
activities of thrs divrsion are the Leclerc svstem.
u'hccled and tracked armoured vehicles, tank and
naval turrets, termmal informatron systems and
logrstical support.
57. The Leclerc battle tank. GIAT's flagship
vehrcle, is considered capable of meetrng present
and future operatronal needs rvell mto the next
century. It has been chosen by,thc French armv
as rts main fightrng component.
58 The Leclerc carries a crew of 3 and has a
combat rverght of 55 tonnes. a maxlmum speed
of 70 km/tr, a maxlmum cross-country speed of
50 km/h and a 500 km range (700 km rvrth drs-
posable tanks)
59 The Leclcrc carnes a 120 mm smooth borc
gun rvith a cahbre length of 52 rvhrch means that
it fires projectiles rvrth exceptronal initial velo-
crtv, stabrlity and precision The tank also has a
12 7 mm machine gun mounted coaxrally and a
7 62 mm machme gun mounted externallv on the
turret roof It also has a Galix launcher system
rvhich can throlv smoke, antrpersonnel or infra-
red decol'grenades.
60. The Leclerc is also equipped with a
Leclerc Battlefield Management S1'stem (LBMS)
allorvrng it to communicate in real time wrth sur-
verllance and combat unrts on the battlefield. Its
onboard digrtal computers receive, analyse, man-
age and automatically transmrt internalll, gener-
ated data, e.g navrgation and enemv location
data, and draw on externalll'generated data from
the computerised commurucations netrvork.
61. The observatron and fire control system
consists of a commander's HL-70, 360" stabi-
lised panoramic srght rvith two magruficatrons,
an LI (hght intensification) channel (HL-80
option rvith thermal camera and laser range-
finder), a gunner's HL-60 stabrlised srght, urth
two magnificatrons, a day and thermal mfrarcd
channel and laser rangefinder and a vrdeo sy,stem
replicatrng the gunner's sight to the tank com-
mander.
62. GIAT Industrres also produces a family of
front-armoured cars (VAB) covering a complete
range of specialised armoured personnel carners
for drfferent tlpes of missrons. More than 5 000
vehicles belonging to this family'have been pro-
duced to date and are in service in the French
arml,and in the armies of a further 14 countrres.
4 x 4 and 6 x 6 models exist in both the VAB and
the VAB NG (ner,r'generation) configuration.
63. The VAB VCI Dragar rs an armoured
rnfantry'fightrng and support vehicle and a means
of transport on the battlefield, thanks to its hrgh
mobrlitl'and specral arrnour. The Dragar carnes
a crew of 8 
- 
a prlot and one man ln the front
compartment, a gunner in the turret and 5 men in
the rear compartmcnt. The total combat weight
of the 4 x 4 version is 12 6 tonnes rvhile the 6 x 6
verslon rverghs 13 8 tonnes It is armed with a
25 mm GIAT rndustries 25 M 8l I gun rvrth dual
feedrng, a 7.62 mm coaxral machine gun and 6
Gahx grenade launchers The Dragar has pro-
tection against 7.62 mm AP (armour prercing)
rounds at anv drstance and, among various other
options, can be fitted wrth a laser rangefinder and
a thermal camera rvrth a 2 500 m range.
64. Other famrlv members are the VAB APC
(armoured personnel carner). the head of the
family. several thousand of which are in servlce
with the French Army, the VAB VTM (mortar
towing vehicle) 120, the VAB PC (command
post vehicle) the VAB Recoven, (armoured
recovery and rvorkshop vehicle) and the VAB
Ambulance.
65. Lastly, rt should be noted that GIAT has
various cooperation agreements u'rth a number of
European and Amencan firms, for example, the
future 155 rnm self-propelled howrtzer and
ammunitron and the 155 Bonus intelligent arrrmu-u lg96estimates.
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nrtron m partnershrp rvith Bofors of Slveden, the
future 140 mm tank weapon (FTMA) rvith
Rhernmetall of Germany and Bntrsh Roval
Ordnance, the 25 mm turret programme rvith
Otobreda of Ital1, or the RAH 66 Comanche gun
turret system with Lockheed Martin of the United
States
(iv) Italy
66 The Itahan Defence Ministry takes the
vicw that the present strategic plcture resultmg
from the disappearance of the bipolar world has
led to reductions rn mrlitary equipment. However
the variety of possible operational frameworks
(general warfare, regronal conflict situatrons and
peacekeepmg operatrons) require that a propor-
tron of tradrtronal mechanrsed armoured vehicles
should be retained and that units should be
lighter and more flexible Crisis rntervention
tasks are hkely to assume an rmportance that rs
equal to if not greater than traditronal theatre
operations. All these changes demand the mtro-
ductron of specialised hardware and equipment in
order to strrke a fine balance betrvecn strategrc
mobility requirements and classic fire-polver,
protectron and tactical mobilitv.
67. The Italian Army has therefore decided to
procure trvo tlpes of combat vehicle, tracked
main battle tanks and wheeled armoured vehicles
To meet the specifications for vehrcles for inter-
vention in classrc battlefield operations, a sec-
ond-generatron battle tank and an infantry fight-
rng vehrcle have been developed.
68 The Arrete CI is currently being brought
into service and studies are being carried out for
an advanced second or third-generation battle
tank. Also, the Dardo infantry fightrng vehicle
rvill soon recelve approval
69 Moreover the need to equrp tactrcal recon-
naissance units wrth vehicles with high strategic
and operatronal mobrlity rvhich are also able to
carry out peacekeeping tasks has led to the set-
trng-up of an R & D programme to develop two
scparate famrhes of wheeled armoured vehicles.
70. The first comprises combat-weight
vehicles of between 24 and 28 tonnes, hke the
Centauro, u'hich has been in service sinc_e 1992,
and the VBC 8 x 8.
7l. The second of these families consrsts of
vehrcles under 8 tonnes like the Puma 6 x 6 and
4x4
72. The Centauro Bl tank destrovcr was
designed to carry out tactical reconnaissance and
terntorial defence tasks. The cavalry unit rs
equrpped wrth this vehrcle rvhrch rs fitted x'ith a
105 mm high-pressure gyrostabrlised gun and
assocrated automated fire control s1'stem. It has
high road mobilitl,, a good power to weight ratio,
a long range and good cross-countn'mobility,
73 The Centauro carries a fully' armed and
equipped crew of 2 to 4 men, rvhrch makes it
extremely flexrble to use, especialh' in
peacekeeping operatrons,
74 In order to have a troop carner rvith
mobility and protection specrficatrons similar to
those of the Centauro tank, development has
begun on a family of medrum tanks whose mam
characteristic is a high degree of mteroperabrlrtl,
with other tanks The battlefield versron (VBC
8 x 8) already exrsts rn prototlpe.
75. This rvill carry 7 fullv equipped men in
addition to the tank commander and the prlot and
may' be armcd rvith a rangc of equipment such as
a 12.7 mm machme gun and a 25 or 60 mm can-
non, plus two missrle launchers.
76. Beanng in mrnd Italy's recent expenence
in Somaha and Bosrua, a possrble use has
emcrged for short-range heaq' automatic arrna-
ments against interposing forces rather than a
range of 400-500 m, as ln a cold-war scenario.
77 Vchrcles in thc Centauro family have a
basic protectron guaranteed to rvithstand
14.5 mm bullets (25 mm on the front scctron).
This can be increased to 30 mm by bolting on
additional protection.
78. The Centauro \\'as deplol,'ed in Somaha
and former Yugoslavia and has proved its tough-
ness and the suitabilrty of rts gun sl,stem for usc
in peacekeeping operations as rvell as in the
reconnaissance tasks for whrch lt was desrgned
and developed.
79. Because of therr characteristrcs, these
tanks have been used to escort motor convo\rs,
for rvide area control and for road patrols, and
have proven rapid mterventron capabilrty in
unforeseen crises.
80. As mentioned prevrously', the Italian
army's tank flcet will include a family of Puma
class tanks. These are smaller and lighter than
the Centauro.
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8l The Puma famrly wrll probably enter into
scrvice in 1998 in tu,o basrc configurations. a
4 x 4 and a 6x6 version, both capable ofa high
degree of strategic and tactical mobilitl, and r.rrth
protection able to withstand 7 .62 mm bullets
(12.7 mm on the front section) The possibrlrty'
of mounting them wrth a vast range of weapons
s)'stems grvcs them wide flexibilrtl'of use.
82. The Puma 4 x 4 lvrll be used to equip hght
rnfantry regiments to increase levels of protection
in territorial defence and peacekeeping opera-
tions.
83. The Puma 6 x 6 will be assigned to the
cavalry uruts for tactical reconnaissance tasks
Prototype tnals have proved satrsfactory' for the
trme berng and everything seems to suggest that
approval wrll follow in the course of this vear.
84 It rvas noted earher in this section that the
Ariete battle tank u,as about to enter into service.
Thrs has a cre\\' of four, a combat weight of 52
tonnes, a maxlmum speed of 65 km/h, a 550 km
range and is able to surmount 60% gradients.
85. It comes mounted rvrth a 120 mm gun,
integrated fire control s)'stem with laser range-
finder and a 7.62 mm machme gun. It will also
be fittcd with a stabihsed panoramic periscope
rvith night and day srght (infrared camera) and a
digital fire control sl,stem and other advanced
technologrcal facilitres
86. Lastly, mentron should be made of the
Dardo infantry fightrng vehrcle rvhrch rs about to
be approved b1'the Itahan arm)' . The Dardo is a
combat tank and a motorised personnel carrier
It can accommodate a 3 + 7 crerv and rs armed
u'rth a 25 mm cannon, antr-tank mrssiles and a
fire control systcm with a laser rangefinder.
87 All the vehicles referred to above are pro-
duced by the Iveco-Fiat-Oto Melara 50/50 joint
venture, a consortium set up in 1985 to produce
combat vehicles, rvith plants in Bolzano (Iveco)
and La Spezra (Oto Melara). Iveco produces
engines, spare parts, suspenslon systems, tracks
and the hull for the rvheeled vehicles, and Oto
Melara the rveaponry, fire-control svstem, turrets
and optical systems and hulls for the tracked
vehrcles.
(v) Uniled Kingdom
88. The Aerospace and Defence Directorate of
Bntaln's Department of Trade and Industry
looks. as far as mam battle tanks are conccrned.
to three Brrtish manufacturers, Vickers, GKN
and Alvrs, which are world wrde producers and
exporters of these tr4:es of vehrcle
89. Vrckers Defence systems started work on
the Challenger 2 in November 1986 as a private
venture and shortly aftenvards, rn March 1987,
made rts first presentatron of the vehicle to the
British Mmrstn, of DefenceT. In February 1988,
Vickers submrtted a formal proposal regarding
the tank to the MOD follou'ing the rssue of the
staff requirement
90. In December 1988 rt u'as announced that
Vrckers Defence Systems was to bc awarded a
f,90 million contract to undertake a demon-
stratron phase (also referred to as the proof of
principle phase) which lasted untrl September
1990.
91. In June l99l the British Government
selected the Challenger 2 ar,d placed an order
worth f520 mrlhon for 127 Challenger 2 MBTs
and 13 driver tramrng tanks Production began
in 1993 and the first vehicles were dehvered rn
July' 1994. The Challenger 2 was produced at the
Vrckers Defence Systems plants in Leeds and
Newcastle
92 The Challengcr 2 is the first British Army,
tank since World War II to be desrgned, devel-
oped and produced exclusrvely by a single con-
tractor, Vickers Defence S1'stems, with sct reh-
abrlrtv goals lard doun in the fixed price con-
tract.
93. In July 1994, Vrckers Defence Sl,stems
rvas arvardcd a second contract b1,the UK MOD
for the suppll' of 259 Challenger 2 and nine
dnver training tanks plus training and logrstrc
support The total value of the contract is f800
mrlhon and means that production of the Chal-
lenger 2 wrll contrnue at least until the year 2000
and that the Brrtrsh Army will be equipped rvith
Challenger 2s whrle the Challenger I u,ill be
phased out.
94. The Challenger 2 is the best protected tank
in NATO8 mcorporatmg Chobham second-
generation arrnour plating Its NBC (nuclear,
' Jonr's Armour and -lrtillerv, 1996-199'1 .8- Lvotucton aet carro de combate en el mundo
ftl'orldwtde developments m combat tanks) . Jos6 de
Francisco Garcia, Madrid 1993.
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biological and chemical protection) system is
capable of dealing wrth all knorm threats and, for
the first time in any Brrtrsh tank, the crew com-
partment has both a heating and a cooling sys-
tem.
95 The main armament consrsts of a Nottrng-
ham 120 mm rifled tank gun designated the L30.
It also incorporates a McDonnell Douglas Heli-
copter Systems 7.62 mm cham gun, whrch is
already rn service rn the Brrtrsh Armv, bemg
installed in the GKN Defence Warrior mecha-
nised combat vehrcle, and a 7.62 mm anti-air-
craft machine gun.
96. The Challenger 2's fire control system is
the latest-generatron digital computer from Com-
puting Devices Company (CDC) of Canada and
is an improved version of that rnstalled rn the US
MlAl Abrams tank. It also has growth capacrty
for future enhancement such as a Battlefield
Information Control System and navrgation ards
97. The Challenger 2 carries a crew of 4 and
has a combat rverght of 62.5 tonnes. It has a
maximum road speed of 56 km/h and a range of
250 km cross country and 450 km on the road.
98. The Challenger I has becn in service u'ith
the Brrtrsh Army srnce 1983 It r.vas originally
produced by the Ro1,al Ordnance Facton' in
Leeds, u'hich was acquired by Vickers Defence
Systems rn 1986. It rs planned to withdraw the
Challenger I from service n 200112002 and
replace it rvith the Challenger 2.
99. Challenger I took part in Operation Desert
Storm where the Iraqr forces failed to take a
single vehrcle out of combat while Challenger
destroyed roughly 300 Iraqi tankse.
100. The GKN Defence Warrior Armourcd
Combat Vehicle rvas accepted for service u'ith
the British Army in November 1984 and produc-
tron began in 1986. The original order of I 053
vehicles has now been reduced to 789, rvrth the
final delivery in 1995.
101. The Warrior, as it is normally called, has a
combat weight of 25.7 tonnes, a maximum speed
of 75km/h (48 km/h in reverse) a maximum road
range of 660 km and is able to mount 60%o gra-
drents and 40% srde slopes It is armed wrth a
30 mm LZl Rarden cannon or a 7 62 mm
machine gun and smoke laying cquipment
consisting of 2 x 4 smoke grenadc drschargers. It
can carry a crew of 3 + 7. Warrior took part rn
Operation Desert Storm in early 1991, where srx
variants rvere deployed
102. The Brrtish Ministry of Defence has also
shown mterest m what rs known as the GKN
Defence Piranha armoured vehicle family.
103. GKN first teamed up wrth MOWAG of
Srvitzerland in 1990 to produce the Prranha
famrly of lvheeled armoured vehicles to meet a
number of requirements in the UK's FFLAV
(Future Family of Light Armoured Vehrcles).
MOWAG and GKN Defence srgned an
agreement rvhich hcensed GKN to be system
pnme contractor for the design, mtegrafion.
production and marketing of the GKN Prranha
8 x 8 for agreed customers. Vehrcles have
already been sold to Saudr Arabia and Oman and
it is hoped that Kuwart rvrll also placc an order
104 The GKN Piranha 8 x 8 can hold up to 15
persons. It has a combat rverght of 123 tonnes,
a maximum road speed of 100 kmlh and a ford-
rng speed of 10.5 km/h. Its maxtmum range ls
780 km and it can be armed for u'hatever role rs
assigned to it.
105. Finally, Alvrs rs the thrrd major Bntrsh
tank manufacturer. Alvis has produced a sub-
stantral part of the Bntish Armr,'s tank fleet and
has mamtained hrgh export levels. Its family of
combat tanks includes the Scorpion. Spartan,
Sultan, Samson and Scimitar tanks and also the
Saracen armoured personnel carner and thc
Saladrn armoured vehicle.
106 Lastlr', rt seems appropriate to deal, albeit
briefly, with the UK Mrnrstry of Defence's pro-
curement policy for dcfence equipment
Although obviously all governments and therr
defence mmrstries rvill cndcavour to spend their
budget efficrently and sensiblr', the British
defence authoritres are particularll' keen to
explain therr thrnking as regards procurement of
defence equrpment.
107 . For the British, procurement is a step-by'-
step process; at every stage a decision has to be
taken u'hether or not to proceed u'ith the project.
For the very largest projects, decrsions urll be
made by ministers. Belorv thrs level. thcre is an
equipment approvals commrttee rvhich draws
together ver)' seruor officcrs from thc scientific
11
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staff, the procurement executlve. finance and
budget staff and the mrlitary rn the shape of the
Vice-Chief of Defence Staff For smaller pro-
jects responsrbrlrtl' rs delegated to more junror
officrals and officers
108. Equrpment requirements are estabhshed on
the basrs of the concepts rvhrch have been
assessed by'the MOD's rntelhgence and planning
staffs
109. Once these requirements have been
approved. a feasibrlrtl, study' rs carricd out to
establish technrcal feasrbility, cost, duratron, risk
and the demand on resources If it is decrded to
go ahead, the results of the feasrbrlity study wrll
be used to prepare a detailed staff requrrement
whrch descnbes in operational terms the functron
and performance of a proposed equrpment.
Every year a hst of unclassified staff targets and
requrrements rs published to help rndustry's for-
rvard planning.
110 The next stage is prolect definrtron where
more detarled technical, trmc and cost appraisals
are carried out before a decision rs taken on
embarking on full del'elopment.
I I I Full development is normally undertaken
by rndustry and aims to ensure that the final
design is capable of meeting operatronal requtre-
ments and that it is economrcalll'vrable.
llZ. The equipment then goes into the produc-
tion phasc and u,ill be acceptance-tested b1' the
Mrnistry of Defence
ll3 The present Brrtrsh Government believes
that the best rvay to run an economv rs through
pnvate enterpnse. This is also true of the
defence rndustry uhich is nor.l,entrrcll' m pnvate
hands The Ministry"s relatronshrp rvith the
defence industry is that of customer to supplier.
Open tender contracts account for 8l%o of total
MOD contracts.
ll4. The British authontres y,our Rapporteur
met during his visit to the MOD Procurement
Executrve Headquarters in Bristol take the vierv
that thc more open the competition, the better 
-
meaning that they are happv to accept bids from
potentral overseas supphers.
I 15. Except m a feu,very special cases there rs
no "buy British" pohcy which rvould give prefer-
ence to natronal firms Generalll', Brrtish pro-
ducts are only bought when they offer the best
value for money. Having said that. rt is onll' farr
to point out that 90oh of expenditure on equrp-
ment goes to Bntrsh firms. reflectrng the fact that
thel' are no\4'ver], competrtrve rn world markets.
116. In short, the British defence authorities
aim in their defence procurement pohcies to
ensure that: the armed forces can obtarn the
equrpment they need at the right time and at an
economlc cost, long-term value for monev can be
ensured, the Government can be seen to allocate
large sums of money fairly and responsibly; the
UK defence rndustry can maintarn and develop
capabilrtres of value to the Ministrl, and rncrease
their general competitivcness.
117 Your Rapporteur feels it r,r'ould also be of
mterest to include some thoughts about the UK's
pohcy' on mtemational defence cooperation,
whrch is often mrsunderstood in other European
countries
118 The Bntrsh MOD takes the vicw that
cooperatlon does not necessanlv make life easier
but that it is at times the onl1, rval' of tackling
ma1or prolects and from that point of vrew rt is a
vrtal part of the British phrlosophy as regards
procurement
I 19. In defence matters cooperation is a means
of meeting the operatronal needs of the armed
forces as far as new-generation high-technologl'
dcvelopments are concerned. Without such co-
operation, the majonty' of European countncs, if
not all, could not copc llrth these requirements,
for financral reasons, ifnone other.
120. Obvrously cooperation can have other
sprn-offs such as interoperabrlity, political coher-
ence or even industrial ratronalisation, but the
Brrtish feel that the basic aim of cooperatron
should be lower development costs than rndivrd-
ual natrons rvould themsclves have to bear,
hrgher production and hence a lowenng of prices.
l2l. At the present trme the Bntish MOD has
30 cooperation pro.;ects on its books, at various
stages of development or production, or indeed in
service 
- 
18 with European partners and a fur-
ther 12 rvith transatlantrc or other non-European
partners.
122. Examples of European cooperation are the
Tornado fighter arrcraft, the Honzon fngate or
the Eurofighter and a document on defence pro-
t2
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curement strateg)' recentl)' concluded that
"substantral future benefit hes in collaboration rn
defence procurement, usually in Europe".
123 For the Brrtrsh defence authonties, a new
militarv requirement does not necessanly mean
devcloping a new product The first step is
rather to find out rvhether an "off the shelf pro-
duct" (i e. one already existing in the market) can
meet the desircd specifications An example
mrght be Brazrl's Tucano training aircraft. the
American Hercules carrier or the US AWACs
124. Cooperatron is a laborious process and
takes time. In fact, rvithout a comrnon under-
standing of requrements. there ts a serious risk
of the lou'est comrnon denominator coming into
play and armed forces thus being supphed with
unsurtable equipment, u'hich rs wholly unaccept-
able. As a result, and pcrhaps fortunately, many
promising cooperation projects farl to get be1'ond
the dran,rng board.
125. Once a consensus has been reached on
requrrements, the financial aspect rs fundamental
in maintaining the impetus of the proJect. It is
esscntial at this stage that thc political rvill of
governments is translated into the necessal)'
funding u'ithin a reasonable, pre-estabhshed
timescale.
126. Other drfficultres which should be pointed
out include the fact that although the nations of
u'estern Europe have simrlar economic standards,
their tcchnological and mdustnal bases may' be
very different It must be remembered that
Europe does not necd additronal industrral
capacity 
- 
there rs alrcady overcapacity 
- 
and
that well thought-out cooperation should seek to
create interdependency via a rationalised indus-
trial base, rather than to add neu' capacrt)'
127. In short, cooperatron cannot be an end in
itself. If well organised it is rather a means of
making hrgh qualrtv products available on a
value for monel' basrs. In the optnion of our
Brrtish contacts, the da1's of rrgid national work
shares determined by each participant's financial
contrrbution are over. The solution must lie in
creatrve alternatrves to the old luste retour con-
cept that will continue to provide a reasonable
return on investments while offering a better
financial deal all round.
III. The state of play in European
cooperation in this oreo
128. Numerous brlateral and multilatcral coop-
eration prograrnmes for armoured cars have been
launched m Europc rvith singular lack of success.
The ASCOD tank referred to in the prcvrous
chapter is perhaps the only exception to the rule.
Thrs rs an example of cooperation bctlveen two
countries, Austria and Spain, whrch has been a
resounding success, owlng to the fact that rt
began at the concept definrtron stage and contin-
ued through to production.
129 No other initiatrve has been successful.
The information avarlable to your Rapporteur
would suggest that WEAG Panel I put fonvard a
cooperation project in this area some years ago,
but this was thrown out m order to avord dupli-
cation wrth NATO. Nor is therc an1' evidence
that NATO's efforts have met with success
130 Your Rapporteur feels that the reasons for
this almost complete failure are probablv manv
and varied. An rndrcation has been given already
of the main characterrstrcs relative to armoured
vehicles: namely, fire pos'er, protection and
mobrlrty'. Drfferent countries have naturally
attempted to lay more emphasls on one or other
of thesc charactenstics so that u'henever an
attempt rs made to cooperate it can be extremely
difficult, not to say impossrblc. to obtatn agree-
ment between those mvolved, Moreover the fact
that there are many countnes u'ith the nccessar)'
technological capabrlitl' to undertake pro-
grammes of this kind has hardll' served to facili-
tate cooperation.
l3 I . This raises another question, namely
rvhether such cooperation projects are not alto-
gcther too ambrtious. Instead of seeking to
dcvelop and manufacture complete sl'stems
would it not be bettcr, at least initralll'. to confine
oneself to more modest aims. for example stand-
ardisrng the munitions and fuels used for the
tanks.
l3Z. Standardisation of logrstical components,
such as certain parts of the chassis, rvould be the
next step, as Jose de Francisco Garcia has pro-
posed in the publication referred to earlierro.
l3
r0 Josd de Francisco Garcia Op. crt.
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133 For the future, Germanr'. France and the
Unrted Krngdom have rssued an mvrtation to ten-
der for a rvheeled armoured carner vehrclerl
134 Everythrng u'ould seem to point to the fact
that GIAT Industries (France), Krauss Maffei
(and rts subsidrary Wegmann-Mak Rheinmetall)
(Germany') and GKN (United Krngdom) will srgn
a cooperation agreement for the destgn of a neu'
tank as specified rn the rnvitation to tender
referred to above
135 At the same trme another consortium com-
peting wrth the one rcferred to above mav poss-
ibll' be formed b1' the British firms Alvis and
Vrckers, thc German Thl,ssen Group and the
Frcnch companv Panhard, whrch is part of the
Peugeot Group.
136 A decrsron by- Germany, France and the
United Kingdom on u-ho rs to lead the project is
unhkely to bc taken for another vear. Discus-
sions between the three partners, rn which it rvas
hoped there u'ould be agreement, have already
been gorng on for l8 months. Drfferenccs keep
emerging over vehrclc specrficatrons and per-
formances and about the lornt management
structure for the prolect
137. In fact, as far as vehrcle design is con-
cerned the Germans and Britrsh alike want a
battlefield command vehrcle and troop carner
u'hrle the Frcnch need is for an infantry combat
tank mounted rvith a turret bearing a 25 mm gun
to complement thcir Leclerc battlefield tank
138. As far as rndustrial organrsatron goes, ref-
erence has been made to existing consortia or
those in the making, but rt should be noted that
their formatron has not been entirely' problem-
free, due to the fact that France wanted GIAT
Industnes to be involved in both consortla 
- 
a
srtuation not acceptable to the British and Ger-
man partners and xhrch has finally led to GIAT
teammg up with Krauss-Maffei and GKN, while
Panhard rvill apparently jorn the rival consor-
trum.
139. Another factor is further complicating the
situatron: the French DGA (armaments director-
ate) has put forward the idea of procuring a low-
cost armoured vehicle to replace the VAB (front
armoured cars) and VBL (light armoured
vehrcles). Le Mondetl reports that this French
optron rs a hedge against failurc of the original
European programme.
140 At a drscussion forum held in Paris by the
IRIS (French Institute for Internatronal and
Strategic Relations) on I3 March last, the Direc-
tor of the JACS (Jornt Armaments Cooperation
Structure) the Frenchman, Marc Prevot, referring
to prehminary forecasts that the JACS would be
in charge of the nerv infantry armoured car pro-
gramme, said that thrs now seemed unlikely in
view of the rccent suggestion that the VBC I pro-
grarnme u'ould be splrtr3
l4l. Poland has in the meantime become an
observer of the VBCI prograrnme and other
countrres have rndicated that they are interested
rn it, although the fate of this particular coopera-
tron programme is far from being decrded.
142. Finally it should also be noted that the UK
company Britrsh Aerospace and Lockheed Mar-
tin of the United States have lorned forces to
compete for a contract for battlefield reconnars-
sance vehicles descnbed as "the modern equiva-
lent of the Cavalry's Indian scout"la for both the
US and the British armies. This is reckoned to be
a rare example of large-scale cooperation
betrveen the two armies.
143. The contract could involve about I 600
vehicles 
- 
t 200 for the US Army and the rest for
the British A*y The vehrcles officially go by
the name Tracer/FSCS (Tactical reconnaissance
armoured combat equrpment requirement/Future
scout cavalry sl,stem) and m Britain would
replace the agerng Scorpion and Scimitar
vehicles nerther of whrch stood out as effrcient
machines in the Gulf and Bosnian conflrcts.
144. A rrval consortium competrng for the same
contract has been set up by GKN and GEC-
Marconi, Accordrng to a Lockheed Martin
spokesman, Tracer will be designed to enter the
battle theatre ahead of the main battle tanks and
gather intelligence through digital electronic
s)'stems as well as being equipped with stealth
technologres.
t2 Le lvIonde,2T March 199'7 .
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145. The programme rvrll be the largest trans-
atlantrc cooperation programme smce the con-
tract between BAe and McDonnell Douglas rn
the 1980s for the productron of the Harrrer.
IV. Conclusions
146. It seems clear that overall, European
cooperation as far as armourcd vehicles are con-
cerned has proved a resounding failure to date.
147 A variety of factors underlte that failure,
in partrcular the large number of countries with
therr oun tank-manufactunng facilities, Euro-
pean overcapacity rn the field and differing levels
ofarvareness natronally as to the need to arnve at
a common concept. Our earlter assessment
stands: ten European countries are involved m
armoured car production whrle in the United
States, where the domestic market is far larger
than that for any one European country, there are
only two such producers.
148. To this one might add the general chmatc
of falling defence budgets which has only served
to exacerbate the already worrying position of
the European defence industry.
149. As far as the future goes the picture rs Just
as worrylng as the tnpartite venture involvrng
France, Germany and the United Kmgdom, for
the construction of a wheeled armoured carner,
has still not got off the ground as the prevrous
chapter rndicates. The symptoms are alarmrng
enough to rvarrant a pessrmistic prognosts The
prolect, rvhich ts to be undertaken under the
auspices of the the JACS, rs strll unsatisfactorl'
from an ovcrall Europcan pcrspcctive
150. It rs thcrefore not easy to understand why
WEAG Panel I drd not envrsage includrng a
study of Europcan cooperatton rn this field in its
work programme and wh1' such attempts as have
been made have been abandoned to avord dupli-
catron wrth srmilar trutiatives taken by NATO,
which it should agarn be stressed, have produced
little result.
t5l. It is time therefore for the European mem-
bers of WEAG together to seek to define one or
more joint concepts that would enable our arrnles
to procure compatible high-performance vehtcles
and help our defence industries restructure and
ratronalise rn order eventually to become com-
petitive in the face of internatronal competition
l5
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